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M. Mandler, Dilemmas in Economic Theory: Persisting Foundational Problems of Microeconomics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001 [Online]. Available: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rhul/detail.action?docID=4964204
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D. C. Mueller, Public Choice II, Rev. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
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H. Moulin, Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making, vol. no.10. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1988.
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M. Mandler, Dilemmas in Economic Theory: Persisting Foundational Problems of Microeconomics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
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M. Mandler, Dilemmas in Economic Theory: Persisting Foundational Problems of Microeconomics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001 [Online]. Available: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rhul/detail.action?docID=4964204
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K. Arrow, ‘An Extension of the Basic Theorems of Classical Welfare Economics’, in Individual Choice Under Certainty and Uncertainty: Collected Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow, volume 2, vol. v.1, Cambridge, Mass: Belknap, 1951, pp. 13–45.
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A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green, Microeconomic Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
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M. Mandler, ‘Indecisiveness in Behavioral Welfare Economics’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 97, pp. 219–235, 2014, doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.04.010.
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D. C. Mueller, Public Choice II, Rev. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
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H. Moulin, Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making, vol. no.10. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1988.
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