Debating China’s Assertiveness
- Debating China’s Assertiveness
To the Editors (Dingding Chen and Xiaoyu Pu write)
In “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?” Iain Johnston argues that China’s recent foreign policy is not as assertive as many scholars and pundits contend. Johnston’s study is a welcome addition to the literature on Chinese foreign policy in three respects.1 First, it is the most comprehensive study by a leading China scholar on China’s new assertiveness. Second, it challenges the conventional understanding that this assertiveness is both unprecedented and aggressive by design. Third, it addresses potential problems of overestimating the threat from China.
In this letter, we argue that Johnston’s definition of assertiveness is too narrow. In addition, he underestimates the significance of China’s new assertiveness in foreign policy more broadly.2
A New Typology of China’s Assertiveness
Johnston states that assertiveness in international politics refers to “a form of assertive diplomacy that explicitly threatens to impose costs on another actor that are clearly higher than before” (p. 9). This definition omits the possibility that assertiveness also has a positive connotation. In social life, for example, “assertiveness” is sometimes associated with positive personal traits such as self-respect and self-confidence.3 Johnston also suggests that China exercises its assertiveness only in territorial disputes and is otherwise a status quo power. Finally, he evaluates China’s assertiveness based on whether China is more or less assertive than it was in the past. [End Page 176]
We argue that China’s assertiveness should be viewed in a broader sense. In social psychology, one definition states that “assertion involves standing up for personal rights and expressing thoughts, feelings and beliefs in direct, honest and appropriate ways which do not violate another person’s rights.”4 Moreover, assertiveness is not the same as aggression.5 Based on this understanding, we define “assertiveness” in international relations as a confident and direct way to defend one country’s rights or claims.
We divide China’s assertiveness into three ideal types: (1) offensive assertiveness, or a great power’s use of coercion to expand its interest and influence without provocation from other countries; (2) defensive assertiveness, in which a great power’s capability and willingness to defend its current interests are growing, yet it seeks only to defend—not expand—those interests; and (3) constructive assertiveness, according to which a great power assumes a leadership role to solve regional and global problems.6 These three types of assertiveness are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Using this typology, we see little evidence that China is engaged in offensive assertiveness. This approach, which assumes that a rising power will naturally expand its interests and influence in the international system, follows the logic of offensive realism and power transition theory.7 To be sure, some recent Chinese actions and statements might suggest to outsiders that China is taking an offensive assertive approach. And as China’s economic power has grown, so has its self-confidence. In the eyes of some Chinese political elites, the 2008 global financial crisis accelerated the shifting balance of power from the West to China.8 Citing the subsequent meltdown, some Chinese analysts began to argue that the United States was in decline. China’s top leaders, however, have a more realistic view of their country’s power, continuing to emphasize that China should maintain its nonconfrontational approach toward the United States.
We suggest that China has adopted a defensive assertiveness approach whereby it continues to defend many of its existing claims, without fundamentally changing its policy on those issues despite its growing capabilities. This approach applies to China’s territorial disputes. Additionally, when China has demonstrated an assertive posture, it has been in reaction to unwelcome and unforeseen events often initiated by other countries in the region. For instance, in territorial disputes involving the South [End Page 177] China Sea or the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, China has strengthened its maritime capabilities and sent more ships and airplanes into those regions. In other territorial disputes, it has begun to use economic sanctions. For instance, in the case of the China-Philippines...
